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NAMEN 11: DO THE TRIBES HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO
REGULATE NON-INDIAN RIPARIAN RIGHTS ON
FLATHEAD LAKE?
Sheri L. Flies
I.

INTRODUCTION

Non-Indian owners of land riparian to the south half of Flathead Lake
are subject to the regulation of their property, which is situated below the
highwater mark, by the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the
Flathead Reservation. The purpose of this casenote is to examine how the
Tribes acquired this regulatory authority.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Namen I
The 1855 Treaty of Hell Gate1 established the Flathead Indian
Reservation in what is now western Montana. The treaty provided that the
south half of Flathead Lake would be contained within the boundaries of
the reservation.2 Subsequently in 1904, Congress passed the "Flathead
Act," s which authorized allotments in reservation land to Indian residents.
The Act was implemented by congressional proclamation in 1904." Under
this new policy, a federal patent was issued to Antoine Morais, a Flathead
Indian, for an allotment of reservation land riparian to the south half of
Flathead Lake.5
In 1973, the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead
Reservation [hereinafter referred to as Tribes] initiated an action in
Federal court for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the
Namens, successors in interest to Morais.6 The Namens operate a marina
on the land, and have constructed docks and other facilities that extend
beyond the highwater mark of the lake onto the bed and banks. 7 The state
of Montana and the City of Poison [hereinafter referred to as Poison] also
own riparian land upon which similar structures, extending beyond the
1. 12 Stat. 975 (1859). The treaty was between the Flathead Nation and the United States
Government. The Flathead Nation included the tribes of the Flathead, Kootenai, and Upper Pend
d'Oreilles Indians.

2. Id.
3. 33 Stat. 302, ch. 1495 (1904).
4.

36 Stat. 2494 (1909).

5. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 380 F. Supp. 452,456 (D.Mont. 1974),
affd, 534 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976). This has been designated as
Namen L

6. Id.
7.

380 F. Supp. at 455.
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highwater mark, are located." The Tribes claimed that the Namens were
trespassing on reservation property by erecting buildings and structures
below the highwater mark. The Tribes asked the district court to enjoin all
future trespass, require Namens to remove all structures below the
highwater mark, and restore those lands to their original condition. 9
The district court held that: 1) the Namens owned the title to the
highwater mark; 2) the United States owned title to the beds and banks
below highwater mark in trust for the Tribes; and 3) the Namens had a
federal common law right of access and wharfage out to navigable
waters. 10 The Namens, therefore, had a right to build structures below the
highwater mark to allow them to enjoy their right of access and wharfage.11
The district court's holding was based upon two principles: First, that
"[i] n all other situations in which the Federal Government holds title to the
beds and banks of navigable waters, a fee patent issued by the United
States to riparian lands would include the rights of access and wharfage
without an express provision in the patent"1 2 and second, where the United
States holds title in trust for Indian tribes, federal common law applies.13
The court reserved judgment on the question of whether the Namens'
structures abused their riparian rights."
B.

Namen II

Namen 1P5 consisted of three lawsuits that were consolidated for trial.
In 1975, the City of Polson, Montana, with the state of Montana
intervening, filed suit against the Tribes for a declaratory judgment that
the Flathead Reservation had been terminated by the enactment of the
1904 Flathead Act. In 1977, the United States, as trustee for the Tribes,
filed suit for a declaratory judgment that the Flathead Reservation had not
been terminated, and that the Tribes had the authority to regulate the use
of the beds and banks of the south half of the lake."' Also, in 1977, the
Tribes enacted the Shoreline Protection Ordinance with the approval of
the Secretary of Interior. The purpose of the Ordinance is to regulate

8.

Id. at 452 n. 2.

9. 380 F. Supp. at 455.
10.
REV.

380 F. Supp. at 466. See Note, Namen"RiparianRights on FlatheadLake, 1 PuB. LAND. L.

103 (1982).

11. 380 F. Supp. at 457.
12. Id. at 466.
13. Id.
14. 380 F. Supp. at 467.
15. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1982).
16. 665 F.2d at 963-64.
17. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribe, Ordinance 64A (July 19, 1977 and revised,
October 16, 1977).
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riparian structures along the south half of the lake.' 8 The Tribes initiated a
suit claiming Namens' structures violated the Ordinance, abused their
riparian rights, degraded water quality and interfered with Tribal fishing
rights."9
The district court held that the reservation had not been terminated or
diminished and that the United States held title to the south half of the lake
in trust for the Tribes.20 The court, however, held that the Tribes had no
authority to regulate the riparian rights of the Namens, Poison, and the
state of Montana. 2 ' Each party appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
22
Ninth Circuit on some aspect of the district court's decision.

I

III.

ANALYSIS OF NAMEN

II

The Ninth Circuit considered three issues: termination, ownership,
and regulation.
A.

The Termination Issue

Congressional intent was critical when deciding whether the 1904
Flathead Act had terminated the Flathead Indian Reservation because
23
reduction or termination of a reservation requires congressional action.
the Act, from
Congressional intent can be shown either on the face of
24
history.
legislative
from
or
surrounding circumstances,
Intent on the face of the Act can be found in three ways: 1) explicit
language of termination; 25 2) less explicit "language of cession";26 or 3)
27
statutory reference to diminished or reduced reservations. Poison atAct which granted
tempted to analogize certain sections of the Flathead
surplus lands to Montana for school purposes 28 and banned liquor sales on

18. 665 F.2d at 954.
19. Id.
20. 665 F.2d at 954.
21. Id.
22. Id. Namens, Montana and Poison appealed from the rulings on the ownership issue and the
termination issue. The Tribes and the United States appealed from the ruling on the regulatory issue.
23. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 586 (1977); Mattzv. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481,

504-505 (1979); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425,444 (1975), mentioned at 665 F.2d
at 954, 955 n. 3.
24. 665 F.2d at 955.
25. For example, "the Smith River reservation is hereby terminated." Act of July 27, 1868, ch.
248, 15 Stat. 198, 221. See 665 F.2d at 955 n. 4.
26. For example, Indians agreed to "cede, surrender, grant, and convey all their claim, right,
title and interest." 665 F.2d at 955 n. 5.
27. For example, "diminished reservation" was held to have diminished the Pine Ridge

Reservation in United States ex rel Cook v.Parkinson, 525 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 982 (1977); 665 F.2d at 955 n. 6.

28. Section 8, ch. 1495, 35 Stat. 781.

NAMEN H

1983]

surplus land29 to similar provisions in other Acts which were construed as
intent to disestablish the lands.30 The court, however, cited several statutes
with the same provisions that did not terminate the reservation. 31 The court
did not find any intention by Congress, on the face of the Act, to terminate
the Flathead Reservation. 2
The legislative history of the Flathead Act is sparse.33 Nevertheless,
according to the court, the Act was changed in such a way prior to its
enactment as to suggest that there was no Congressional intent to
terminate the reservation. 4 At the request of the Secretary of the Interior,
the language was changed from lands "in the tract herein ceded" to "in the
tract under consideration" because the Tribes had not agreed to cession.35
Polson urged the court to recognize that Congress enacted three other
statutes that same week which were held to terminate reservations.36 The
court distinguished these statutes from the Flathead Act, noting that the
former ratified prior negotiations regarding cession, whereas there had
been no prior negotiations on that subject with the Tribes. 7
Finally, Polson urged the court to consider three "surrounding
circumstances": 1) general federal policy, prevailing at the time of the
1904 Act, to disestablish existing reservations; 2) prior negotiations with
the Tribes suggesting termination; and 3) subsequent administrative and
legislative actions suggesting termination.38 The court found evidence of
federal policy "scanty" 39 and inapplicable. While it was true that, at the
turn of the century, Congress adopted a program for allotting land to the
Indians and opening the surplus land to non-Indians, this was not the same
as an explicit or implicit policy of termination.4 °
Prior negotiations with the Tribes failed to induce them to cede land to
the United States. Polson contended that Congress intended to terminate
29. Section 21, Act of March 3, 1909, ch. 263, 35 Stat. 781, 795-96.
30.

665 F.2d at 956.

31.

Id.at 956 n. 11.

32. In fact, the purpose of the Act refers to the reservation in an existing sense. The Act is
described as "an Act for the survey and allotment of lands now embraced within the limits of the
Flathead Indian Reservation, in the State of Montana, and the sale and disposal of all surplus lands
after allotment." Ch. 1495, 35 Stat. 302.

33. 665 F.2d at 956.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36.

665 F.2d at 957 n. 12 (Rosebud Act, Devils Lake Act, Crow Act).

37.

655 F.2d at 957.

38.

Id.

39.

665 F.2d at 957 n. 15.

40.

Federal policy of outright termination was espoused by only one individual, Thomas J.

Morgan, Commissioner of Indian Affairs under President Benjamin Harrison. When Cleveland
succeeded Harrison as President, a new Secretary was appointed who expressed doubts about
reservation termination. 665 F.2d at 957 n. 15.
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the reservation by authorizing the negotiations and the intent was then
carried out by Congress unilaterally adopting the Flathead Act. This
41
rationale was held to be ill-advised.
The subsequent legislative and administrative actions were composed
of three subparts: a) jurisdictional history, b) pronouncements of officials
in the Interior Department and c) subsequent congressional legislation.
Polson contended state jurisdictional authority had supported termination
previously.42 The court stated the Flathead situation was different. Indeed,
the Montana Supreme Court had disclaimed state jurisdiction over major
crimes 43 and civil disputes between Indians and non-Indians 4" on the
Flathead Reservation.4 5
Poison relied upon numerous pronouncements by officials of the
Interior Department indicating a belief that the reservation had been
terminated. 4" The court noted that the Tribes had voluminous support for
its contention that the reservation had not been terminated. The court felt
neither party's evidence was persuasive or significant. 47 But Polson pointed
to congressional actions after 1904 that referred to the "former" Flathead
Reservation to demonstrate that Congress intended to terminate the
reservation. 48 The court pointed out, however, that there were only two
references to "former" reservation compared to seventy-two references to
"existing" reservation after 1904. 49
In summary, the court held there was no congressional intent to
terminate the reservation either on the face of the Act, or from legislative
history, or from surrounding circumstances after the Act was passed.
B.

Ownership Issue

The Ninth Circuit had previously held, in Montana Power Co. v.
0 that the United States holds title to the bed and banks of the
Rochester,"
41. The Court said "[t]his is an unjustified extension of the reasoning of Rosebud," [Rosebud
Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977), which held that the Rosebud Act terminated the

reservation status of a portion of the Rosebud Sioux Reservation] and was ill-advised because the
Rosebud Act terminated a portion and here, Poison wants the entire reservation terminated. 665 F.2d
at 958. Also, there was no prior cession agreement.
42. Rosebud and DeCoteau stated that the State exercised jurisdiction over the lands since the
enactment of the statute. 665 F.2d 959.
43. State ex rel Irvine v. District Court, 125 Mont. 398, 239 P.2d 272 (1951).
44. Security State Bank v. Pierre, 162 Mont. 298, 511 P.2d 325 (1951).
45. 665 F.2d at 959.
46. Id.

47.

"Actions and utterances of federal officers that manifest no single clear perception of the

reservation's status can hardly be treated as a significant item in determining that status." 665 F.2d at

959.
48.
49.
50.

665 F.2d at 960.
665 F.2d at 959.
127 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1942).
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south half of Flathead Lake in trust for the Tribes. The court noted that its
Rochester holding was strongly supported by stare decisis.5 1 Polson
pointed out that this was not entirely true. In United States v. Holt State
Bank52 the United States Supreme Court held that Minnesota became the
owner of the bed of Mud Lake located within the Red Lake Reservation,
upon that state's admission into the Union. But the Ninth Circuit was
convinced that Holt State Bank was inapplicable to the facts of the
54
immediate case.
Polson countered that Rochester was no longer good law due to the
1981 United States Supreme Court decision in Montana v. United
States.5 5 Because of this decision, Polson argued that the Hell Gate Treaty
did not convey beneficial ownership of the south half of Flathead Lake to
the Tribes, but that title passed to the State of Montana upon its admission
into the Union. 6 Montana held that the treaty establishing the Crow
Reservation had not conveyed to the Indians beneficial ownership of the
bed of the Big Horn River, which flows through the reservation. Instead,
title to the river bed had passed to the State of Montana upon its admission
into the Union.57 Montana also cited Holt State Bank approvingly.58
The Supreme Court in Montana stressed that there is a strong
presumption against the United States conveying title to navigable
waterways in a territory, thereby defeating the title to the future state.5 9 It
held that the language of the 1868 Crow Treaty was not strong enough to
overcome the presumption, because the treaty neither expressly referred 6to
0
the riverbed, nor provided a clear intention to convey the riverbed.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that while the treaty gave the
Crow Indians "sole right to use and occupy the reserved land. . . .[The]
mere fact that the bed of navigable water [lay] within the boundaries
described in the treaty [did] not make the riverbed part of the conveyed
land, especially when there is no express reference to the riverbed that

51. United States v. Title Insurance and Trust Company, 265 U.S. 472 (1924); United States v.
Pollman, 364 F. Supp. 995 (D. Mont. 1973); Namen 1,380 F. Supp. 995 (D. Mont. 1973); Oregon ex
rel State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977). Also, the Court stated
that hydroelectric power development has relied upon the Rochester holding. There is an assumption
that the Tribes beneficially own the south half of Flathead Lake and have received rental payments to
demonstrate this beneficial ownership. Since 1975, Montana Power has paid $2.6 million to the Tribes
for the Kerr Dam Project, of which the lake bed rental is $468,000 annually. 665 F.2d at 961 n. 26.
52. 270 U.S. 49 (1976).
53. Id. at 59.
54. 554 F.2d at 961.
55. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
56. 665 F.2d at 961.
57. 450 U.S. at 556-57.

58.

450 U.S. at 552.

59.

450 U.S. at 554.

60.

Id.
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might overcome the presumption against its conveyance." 1
The Ninth Circuit distinguished the Hell Gate Treaty from the Crow
Treaty because the former expressly referred to Flathead Lake. However,
the court went on to point out that the treaty described the northern
boundary of the reservation as bisecting the lake. The court felt a "natural
interpretation" should be adopted which would "infer an intent to convey
title to the southern half of the lake."6 In addition, the inference should be
made because doubtful language in Indian Treaties should be construed in
favor of the Indians. 3 The Hell Gate Treaty also stated that the land
described for the reservation is "for the exclusive use and benefit of said
Confederated tribes as an Indian reservation." ' Montana held that the
"right of exclusivity" even if the same as ownership, could not establish a
reservation grant.
The court distinguished the treaties further:
The Montana Court supported its conclusion. . .by reasoning
that "the situation of the Crow Indians at the time of the treaties
presented no 'public exigency' which would have required" a
departure from the federal policy of reserving ownership of the
land under navigable waters for future states. . . .No exigency
existed because "fishing was not important to [the Crows'] diet or
way of life." By contrast, the Kootenai Indians. . .depended
heavily on fishing.65
Even though the Hell Gate Treaty and Crow Treaty appeared to be
similar, thereby rendering Montana applicable to this case, the court felt
they differed markedly. Therefore, it reaffirmed Rochester and held that
the bed and banks of the south half of Flathead Lake are held in trust for
the Tribes by the United States.
C. Regulatory Issue
The district court held that the Tribes had no power to regulate the
federal common law rights of riparian non-Indian owners of land bordering
the south half of Flathead Lake, because when the reservation was opened
to settlement by non-Indians, the Tribes' regulatory authority had been
implicitly divested. The "implicit divestiture" rationale was derived from
two Supreme Court decisions. Oliphantv. Suquamish Indian Tribe6 ' held
that Indian tribes were prohibited from exercising powers terminated by
61.
62.

Id.
665 F.2d at 962.

63.

Id.

64.
65.
66.

12 Stat. 975-76.
665 F.2d at 962 (citations omitted).
435 U.S. 191 (1978). See 665 F.2d at 963.
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Congress and "those powers inconsistent with their status." United States
v. Wheeler6 7 held that implicit divestiture occurs when relations between
Indians and non-Indians are involved.
The Supreme Court later decided two cases from which emerged two
regulatory rules-the Colville 8 rule and the Montana6 9 rule. The Colville
rule states that "tribal powers are not implicitly divested by virtue of the
tribes' dependent status. . . [on the contrary, divestiture is found only]
with the
where the exercise of tribal sovereignty would be 7inconsistent
0
Government.
National
the
of
overriding interests
The Montana rule provides that "a tribe may also retain inherent
power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee
lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe."'7 1 Montana cited Wheeler approvingly, stating that
the dependent status of the Tribes had implicitly divested them of powers
over non-Indians. 2 Montana went on to state that, "the exercise of tribal
power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to
control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the
'7 8
tribes."
The court found it hard to compose a single theory from the two
rules. 4 Therefore, it applied the Flathead situation to both rules and found
that the Tribes had authority to regulate riparian rights. If the Colville rule
applied the Tribes would prevail because no federal interests would be
impaired.7 5 If the Montana rule applied the court felt the Tribes would
prevail for two "distinct" reasons. First, Montanaheld that the Crow Tribe

67. 435 U.S. 313 (1978). See 665 F.2d at 963.
68. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
69. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
70. Colville, 447 U.S. at 153-54. The National interests included those instances when the tribes
seek to engage in foreign relations, alienate their lands to non-Indians without federal consent, or
prosecute non-Indians in tribal courts which do not accord the full protections of the Bill of Rights. See
665 F.2d at 965. The Court held the tribes could impose cigarette taxes on non-tribal purchasers who
purchased cigarettes on tribal land because the Court could see no overriding federal interest that
would be frustrated by the tribal law.
71. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66. The Court held that non-Indian hunting and fishing did not
threaten the Tribes' political or economic security to justify tribal regulation of the Tribal land-the
Big Hole River and surrounding area.
72. 665 F.2d at 963.
73. 450 U.S. at 564-65.
74. Id.
75. 665 F.2d at 963. The Court disagreed with appellees' suggestion that a federal interest
preventing intrusions on the non-Indian personal liberties, and fulfilling the justifiable expectations of
non-Indians would be impaired. These arguments, the Court felt, were too broad, vague and tenuous.
665 F.2d at 963 n. 30. Also, the Secretary of the Interior approved the Ordinance and the United States
joined theTribes, showing that the federal government approved of the Tribes' actions, and that federal
interests could not then be hindered.
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had the authority to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on lands
held in trust for the tribes if certain requirements were met. 76 By analogy,
the Tribes could regulate the shoreline activities of non-Indian landowners.77 Second, the Crow Tribe could have regulated non-Indian use of
reservation land if the regulated conduct threatened or had some effect on
the "political integrity, economic security or welfare of the Tribe. ' 78 The
court found that these factors were affected by the conduct of non-Indian
riparian owners of property bordering the south half of Flathead Lake.
"Such conduct, if unregulated, could increase water pollution, damage the
ecology of the lake, interfere with treaty fishing rights, or otherwise harm
the lake, which is one of the most important tribal resources. '7 9
The court decided the Tribes had the authority to regulate non-Indian
riparian landowners of the south half of Flathead Lake, and could
therefore, enforce Ordinance 64A.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Namen II was appealed to the United States Supreme Court by
Polson and non-Indian riparian landowners. Certiori was denied on
November 1, 1982.80 Justices Rehnquist and White dissented. They
agreed that the termination issue was correctly decided, but not the
ownership issue or the regulatory issue. They felt that the Montana
decision could lead to a contrary decision and felt review was necessary. 81
With the go-ahead, the Tribes will now be able to enforce Ordinance
64A, the Shoreline Protection Ordinance. Generally, the Tribes may
regulate structures along the shores of the south half of Flathead by issuing
variances, assessing fees and penalties for non-compliance. The existing
4000 docks are expected to be "grandfathered" in and not be affected by
the ordinance as long as they conform to the safety and environmental
standards.82 Namens and all other riparian landowners still hold title to the
highwater mark, but their structures beyond the highwater mark will be
regulated. The effect of this is that the federal common law right of access
and wharfage is not absolute. It is subject to the regulation of the Tribes.

76.

665 F.2d at 964.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Montana, 450 U.S. at 1258.
665 F.2d at 964.
103 S.Ct. 314 (1982).
Id.
Missoulian, Dec. 13, 1982, at 13. col. 4.

